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This study argues that the political considerations were an important factor behind the crisis of
the Brazilian real in January 1999. The divided coalition government and a president facing
impending elections eschewed the correction of external misalignments and the fiscal austerity
at a time when the markets were already excited by the 1997-98 East Asian and 1998 Russian
financial crises. The hypothesis is established after confirming the vulnerability of Brazilian
economy to currency crisis through Masson’s model of multiple equilibrium and then it is tested
by running a maximum likelihood logit regression.
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The famous pegged exchange rate stabilisation program, ‘plano real’, launched in early 1994
achieved its objective of low inflation without provoking any recession. The success
accompanied consumption boom and a notable decrease in poverty and income inequality. The
program, however, culminated in the January 1999 currency crisis. In this context, therefore,
two developments in the post ‘plano real’ period were noteworthy: growing fiscal and external
imbalances and the events of two financial crises during 1997-98.
Among external imbalances, real exchange rate appreciation and current account deficit were
the most alarming. From 1.2 billion dollars in 1994, the current account deficit stood at 34.6
billion dollars in 1998. Many institutions and individuals iterated warnings regarding real
exchange rate appreciation.
2 Consequently, imports increased from 20 billion dollars in 1992 to
57 billion dollars in 1998, an increase of nearly 65 percent, whereas, exports increased by only
31 percent. Furthermore, total external debt rose from 22.57 percent in 1995 to 31.15 percent of
GDP in 1998. High public spending commitments, especially privileges given to the civil
servants, including pensioners, and retirement benefits under generous social security system,
resulted in huge fiscal imbalances. It is not surprising then to find a monumental public sector
debt of 41.9 percent of GDP in 1998. The debt increased at an average rate of 5 percent each
year during 1995-97. However, there was an increase of nearly 17.6 percent in 1998 alone. It is
also evident from the debt figures of the federal government and the central bank: the debt
share of these institutions increased from 18.8 percent in 1997 to 25 percent of GDP in 1998.
In the second part of 1997, successive devaluations in a number of East Asian countries
prompted speculative attacks on many emerging economies currencies, including South
American economies. In an orthodox manner and in accordance with the International Monetary
Fund’s strategy, Brazil was the first among these economies to counter the threat. It did so, by
tightening of monetary and fiscal policies, by increasing interest rates, and by promising a
reduction in the public sector deficit of 2 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, the Brazilian authorities
were unable to satisfy the markets as the turbulence returned in August 1998 when the Russian
ruble experienced crisis. With renewed pledges of reduction in fiscal imbalances, high interest
rates, and due to an agreed loan of 41.5 billion dollars from the International Monetary Fund,
Brazil ended 1998 with an uneasy calm. This, however, lasted until the first week of the year
1999. Following the announcement of a moratorium on debt payments by the governor of Minas
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Gerais, a full-fledged attack on the real began that eventually resulted in the free floating of the
currency on 18 January 1999.
Hence, this brief chronology indicates that the real collapse was preceded by two most
significant and popular indicators of any currency crisis.
3 The first indicator relates to the
deterioration in fiscal and external balances, in line with the predictions of the traditional
literature on currency crises especially the first- and second-generation theories.
4 The second
indicator relates to the events of two similar episodes: East Asian financial melt down during
1997-98 and the fall of the Russian ruble in August 1998. The question, therefore, arises as to
why the Brazilian authorities failed to prevent the crisis despite these glaring indicators and
numerous warnings?
5
After confirming Brazil’s vulnerability to currency crisis through Masson’s model (Section 2), the
paper argues that the answer lies in political factors. Two concepts, ‘war of attrition’ and
‘elections and devaluations’, are first identified and then translated into a theoretical framework
(Section 3). To test the hypothesis, the study uses the maximum likelihood logit estimate
method that shows that the political factors among conventional factors have a strong hint of
explanation to this crisis (Section 4). The findings of this study add to the less-explored political
uncertainties associated with the currency crises. The main hypothesis is briefly competed with
the hypotheses of poor economic fundamentals and pure contagion effects as an alternative
explanation to the January 1999 crisis of the Brazilian real (Section 5).
2 Brazil’s Vulnerability to Currency Crisis
Pure contagion effects, as modelled by Masson (1998) and (1999), refers to the vulnerability of
an economy to contagion for only certain ranges of the fundamentals where changes in
expectations are self-fulfilling and markets are subject to multiple equilibrium. The model is
based on Jeanne (1997). Jeane derives the necessary conditions on Obstfeld’s (1986) and
(1996) hypothesis of grey area of country fundamentals and shows that fundamentals
determine the grey area where multiple equilibrium of a currency crisis is possible. The study
focuses on the 1992-93 crisis of the French franc and describes government temptation to
devalue in order to decrease the unemployment rate. In the context of emerging economies like
                                                          
3 See, among others, Kaminsky, et al. (1998) for the leading indicators of currency crises.
4 See, for seminal literature, Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984), Obstfeld (1986), and Obstfeld (1996).
5 See, among others, several issues of The Economist in 1998 voicing concern over the possibility of the collapse
of the Brazilian real.5
Brazil, however, fundamental like external debt is more significant than unemployment rate. In
particular, the model places prime emphasis on a country’s indebtedness, which as shown,
weakens its fundamentals. The model fairly comprehensively explains the vulnerability of
emerging economies to currency crises.
6
As evident from Table 1, in the year preceding the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis, Brazil’s
fundamentals were in much favourable position. This could be attributed to high level of
international reserves and low level of external debt. However, with the increase in external debt
and reduction in international reserves, the fundamentals were first within the multiple
equilibrium region (1997) and then in highly adverse position (1998). The fact that the economy
was in multiple equilibrium region in 1997 can be translated into a lower probability of crisis and
the economy to be inside crisis region in 1998 into high probability of crisis.
3 What Went Wrong? The Hypothesis
The question arises as to why the Brazilian authorities failed to prevent the crisis despite
obvious fragility, as outlined in the preceding sections. The reason lies in two concepts of
political economy. The first reason stems from the concept of ‘war of attrition’ as modelled by
Alesina and Drazen (1991). A typical example to explain this phenomenon is an unsustainable
budget deficit due to lack of political agreement. The delay in fiscal stabilisation may last until it
becomes extremely costly. In the context of currency crises, this concept is quite suggestive
since it describes the situation of multiple equilibrium. Given that there is deterioration in (lets
say) fiscal balances, the likelihood of a speculative attack increases or decreases with or
without budget deficit along with the actions of key political figures. In spite of numerous
warnings especially after the East Asian and Russian crises, the Brazilian government
represented by a coalition of five political parties failed to convince the markets of its
commitment.
The second reason stems from the concept of ‘devaluation and timing of elections.’ The
argument is that devaluations to correct the exchange rate misalignments are usually delayed
before elections. This is due to the significant political costs that an incumbent might have to
incur by using this policy tool, especially before elections.
7 Stein and Streb (1999) by taking into
account 242 episodes of presidential and parliamentary elections, note that in months 2, 3, and
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4 after elections the average rate of nominal depreciation is 2 percentage points higher than it is
for other months and the average rate of depreciation is more than doubled.
A popular misalignment is the overvalued real exchange rate that tends to arise after an
exchange rate based stabilisation program. To correct this, devaluation is necessary. However,
an incumbent is reluctant in fear of being voted out of office since an overvalued currency
means cheap consumer goods and high real urban wages. The Brazilian Presidential elections
in October 1998 preceded the January 1999 crisis of the real.
Theoretical Framework
This discussion leads to the hypothesis that the political factors among the conventional ones
suggest a strong hint of explanation to the real crash. Thus, the study formulates a relationship
in which unexpected currency depreciation depends on a vector of economic fundamentals
(traditional indicators of currency crises) and consistency of the authorities:
 t i it t t e e         . n i ,..., 1  (1)
Where,  t e  the nominal exchange rate,  t e  the equilibrium exchange rate,  it   the economic
fundamentals,  i   the threshold values for economic fundamentals, and  t   the consistency of
the authorities in following exchange rate maintenance policies. The vector of economic
fundamentals consists of traditional indicators of currency crisis, such as fiscal imbalances,
current account deficit, growth rate, real exchange rate misalignment, and etceteras. Deviations
from their respective threshold values render the situation favourable for a speculative attack.
For example, a growth rate below its threshold value makes the circumstances favourable for a
speculative attack, while a current account deficit below its threshold value accounts for the
opposite.
Here, assumed for simplicity, higher the deviations of economic fundamentals from their
threshold values higher the likelihood of unexpected exchange rate depreciation:
0 ) ( / ) (          i it t t e e n i ,..., 1  (2)7
Consistency means the ability of the authorities to follow policies, consistent with the exchange
rate regime. Thus, higher the consistency less likely is the unexpected exchange rate
depreciation:
0 / ) (         t t t e e (3)
Given a shock, markets discern whether the authorities are consistent or not by observing  t  .
The consistency depends on the degree of difficulty or ease with which the authorities are able
to follow required policies. A government may be particularly good at dealing with an
international lender-of-last-resort, but particularly bad at resisting the temptation of following
expansionary monetary policy in the hope of winning the forthcoming elections. In other words,
consistency crucially depends on non-economic, mainly, political factors. Speculators, thus,
focus on government by observing, for example, timing of elections or its ability to resolve its
internal issues. Hence, the equilibrium of crisis or no-crisis depends upon the ability of the
authorities to signal its consistency.
4 Findings
In order to test the hypothesis presented in the preceding Section, the study uses a maximum
likelihood logit regression method. In this method the dependent variable is dichotomous
assuming the value of 1 when the peg is in effect, 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables can
be divided into three categories. The first to capture the effects of the fiscal stance of the
government: net expenditures (NE) of the government and the ratio of M2 to international
reserves (IR). The second accounts for the external variables: net exports (NE) and real
exchange rate (RER). The final category, consisting of dummy variables, captures the effects of
political considerations: dummy variables to account for the elections (DUMELEC) and the
notion of ‘war of attrition’ (NPP).
8
Table 2 reports the results of the maximum likelihood logit regression. It consists of two
specifications of the estimates. The first does not include the political variables, whereas the
latter accounts for them. As expected, the estimated coefficients have the a priori expected
signs and are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, except for the NE in the first
specification.
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Furthermore, Table 2 shows that based on two grounds the inclusion of political variables helps
to predict the duration of the peg better. First, the Pseudo R
2 improves from 36 percent in the
first specification to 39 percent in the second one. Second, a decrease in the Theil Inequality
Coefficient from 30 percent in specification I to 13 percent in specification II indicates a
considerable improvement in with-in sample predictability of the fit.
For every additional unit in NE, IR, RER, and NX, the conventional indicators of currency crises,
the predicted log odds increase by 0.003 and 2.726 in the first two and decline by 0.204 and
0.003 in the latter two. In other words, increases in NE (Net Expenditure) and IR
(M2/International Reserves), which signify the deterioration of the fiscal stance of the
government, increase the probability of the abandonment of the peg by 0.003 and 2.726
respectively. While a rise in RER (Real Exchange Rate) and NE (Net Exports), which signify the
external competitiveness of the economy, reduces the probability of the abandonment of the
peg by 0.204 and 0.003 respectively.
This empirical exercise results in quite compelling role of political factors that undermined the
real peg: the predicted log odds for the political variables are much higher. Other things being
equal and DUMELC to be 1 (that is, when elections), the log odds increase by 7.83. Other
things being equal and NPP to be 5 (that is, the highest number of political parties forming
government), the log odds increase by 34.03. However, taking NPP to be 1 (that is, one political
party in the government), which signifies less or no conflict, the probability of the abandonment
of the peg reduces to 6.806.
6 Concluding Remarks
This study has argued that the political considerations were an important factor behind the crisis
of the Brazilian real in January 1999. In particular, the divided coalition government and a
president facing impending elections eschewed the correction of external misalignments and
the fiscal austerity at a time when the markets were already excited by the 1997-98 East Asian
and 1998 Russian financial crises.
This hypothesis, nevertheless, can be questioned on two interconnected grounds. In the
literature on currency crises there is a dearth of empirical studies that account for the linkages
between political variables and currency crises. In single-country literature there is no
investigation of the aforementioned linkage; see, for example, Blanco and Garber (1986),9
Cumby and Van Wijnbergen (1989), Goldberg (1994), Pazarbasioglu and Ötker (1997), and
Ötker and Pazarbasioglu (1997). In multi-country literature only two notable studies, Klein and
Marion (1997) and Eichengreen, et al. (1996), account for this relationship; others include,
Frankel and Rose (1996) and Kaminsky, et al. (1998).
In general, these studies focus on economic fundamentals as the prime determinants of crises.
Therefore, how compelling are the present findings given that poor economic fundamentals
have usually tend to predict the outcome? Secondly, the crisis was preceded by East Asian and
Russia crises. Therefore, how much of a light could pure contagion effects throw on this
episode?
As evident from Table 1, the fundamentals of the Brazilian economy were known to be weak
both in 1997 (inside multiple equilibrium region) and in 1998 (inside crisis region). Thus, from
the point of view of poor economic fundamentals and from the point of view of pure contagion
effects, why did the markets not react in 1997 and in 1998? Why did they wait until January
1999? Indeed, one explanation comes from the political uncertainties, as signified by the
consistency of the authorities called into question in Section 3.
The fact that political variables turn out to be significant, relative to the conventional ones,
highlights the importance of non-economic factors in determining a currency crisis. This may not
imply that non-economic factors have the final say. A healthy economy with sound
macroeconomic fundamentals may remain immune from speculative attacks. It is the unhealthy
economy with weak macroeconomic fundamentals that invites the attention of investors in the
first place. The investors then assess the commitment of the authorities by contemplating non-
economic (political in this case) factors. Thus, the consistency is the key to understand the
political uncertainties associated with the exchange rate crises, as signified in the Brazilian
case.10
Appendix I: Masson’s Model
The probability of crisis ( ) depends on the size of external debt (D) and the extent of
devaluation ( ) along with the value of economic fundamentals (b ) relevant for currency crises.
Formally, letting  D    ,  1   t t t b E  , and assuming the innovation in  t b ,  1    t t t b   , to have a
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F , then:
 t t t F      (I.1)
Thus, a decrease in the composite fundamental ( t  ) and a higher external debt leads to higher
probability of crisis. The model gives two conditions for multiple equilibrium to occur. The first
condition requires that in Equation (I.1) the slope of right hand side to be steeper than that of









  is the conventional constant (3.141) and the condition shows the size of external debt and
the extent of devaluation, relative to the standard deviation ( ) of shocks to the composite
fundamental. The second condition requires  t   to be within minimum and maximum values:
w w F w w F t           ) ( ) ( (I.3)
Where,  ) (ln 2 z w  . In particular, Inequality (I.3) gives the tangency points of the c.d.f of the
normal distribution, where, 
max
t   is the good equilibrium above that is the no-crisis region, 
min
t   is




t  ) is the
multiple equilibrium where crisis may or may not happen.
In implementing the aforementioned conditions, an autoregressive process of order one for the
current account deficit ( t C ) as a percent of GDP over 1980 to 1999 is estimated. The standard
error of this regression, that is 1.72%, is taken as the estimate of   and   is assumed to be
25.00%, though real depreciated by more than this assumption in the first quarter of 1999.
9 After
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determining the criterion and the range for multiple equilibrium, the composite fundamental ( t  )
is calculated using the following assumption:
t t t t t D r R R C E
* ) (      (I.4)
Where,  ) ( t C E  the fitted value from the regression for the current account deficit,  t R  the level of
international reserves, R  the threshold value of international reserves (assumed to be zero), 
*
t r
the foreign interest rate (U.S. one year rate on Treasury Bill), and  t D  the external debt.
Appendix II: Estimation Methodology and Data
The estimation methodology is based on the maximum likelihood logit estimates wherein the
dependent variable is dichotomous assuming the value of one if the peg is in effect, zero
otherwise. In particular, to identify the forces that undermine an exchange rate peg, consider a
linear probability model that comprises dichotomous  i   as a linear function of the explanatory
variable(s)  i  :
10
i i i         2 1  (II.1)
Assuming  0 ) (   i  ,  i   as the probability of the abandonment of the peg, and  ) 1 ( i    as the
probability of not abandoning the peg, the relationship in (II.1) in cumulative logistic distribution
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Where  ) 1 /( i i     is simply the odds ratio in favour of abandoning the peg. By taking the natural
log of (II.2), the standard logit model is given as:
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But the L.H.S. of Equation (II.4) gives meaningless expression by taking  i   as 1 and 0. In this
situation the standard OLS method cannot be used to run the regression. Nonetheless, the
maximum likelihood method can be used to estimate the parameters. Whereas, the maximum-
likelihood method involves the maximisation of the logarithm of L by substituting for the
probability functions. The logarithm of L can now be written as follows:
) 1 log( log log i i L      (II.5)
To obtain the estimators  1 ˆ   and  2 ˆ  , we differentiate log L with respect to 1 and 2 set the
result equal to zero and solve:
0
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(II.7)
The empirical part of the currency crises literature, using non-structural estimation approach,
has focused on probit regressions. While both logit and probit models are of qualitative choice,
the difference between them is merely of mathematical convenience.
11 The statistical inference
of the results of logit model is similar to that of a standard OLS estimation.
12 See, for example,
Klein and Marion (1997) for an application of logit model in determining the duration of
exchange rate pegs in a multi-country analysis.
Data Used in the Study
A total of six explanatory variables are used in this investigation. The first four variables
represent the internal and external imbalances and the last two, one dummy and one index, to
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capture the effects of political factors. The choice of the first four variables stems from two facts:
first that they are the conventional indicators of currency crises and secondly due to the
availability of the data. All the observations are monthly, January 1990 to July 1999, from
International Financial Statistics database. The dependent variable takes the value of one from
July 1994 to December 1998, zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are as follows.
NE: Net Expenditure
This variable, defined as the expenditure minus revenue of the federal government, attempts to
capture the fiscal imbalances that preceded the crash. It is expected that higher expenditure net
of revenues would have positive affect on the likelihood of crisis.
IR: M2/International Reserves
Defined as M2 to foreign exchange reserves, IR captures the effects of the loss of foreign
exchange reserves prior to the crisis in a scaled form. A positive association between the
likelihood of crisis and M2/international reserves is expected.
NX: Net Exports   
This variable is calculated by subtracting imports from exports and tries to capture the external
vulnerability of the economy. A higher value of net exports would reduce the likelihood of
devaluation thus a negative relationship between net exports and probability of ending the peg
is expected.
RER: Real Exchange Rate
The present study uses the textbook definition of real exchange rate
 thus it is expected that a
higher value of real exchange rate is associated with a lesser likelihood of the crisis. In
particular, Real exchange rate = nominal exchange rate (price of foreign country’s tradable/price
of domestic country’s non-tradable). Where, foreign country’s tradable is the wholesale price
index of United States and domestic country’s non-tradable is the consumer price index of
Brazil.
DUMELC:
This is a dummy variable, responsible to capture the effects of elections on the likelihood of a
crisis. This variable assumes the value of one in the six months preceding the elections,
including the election month. In accordance with the theoretical assumption, a higher value of
DUMELC would reflect a higher likelihood of crisis. The fact that the DUMELC is given the value
of 1 for six observations is based on two grounds. First, in a sample of 115 observations, two14
observations with 1 may not account for the effects. Second, election campaigns start much
earlier than the actual month.
NPP:
This variable refers to the number of political parties forming a government. The index would
take the value of zero for dictatorial systems, one for single-party government, two for two-party
coalition government, three for three-party coalition government, and so on. It is expected that
the higher the number of political parties the higher the conflict and the higher the likelihood of
crisis. The index assumes the value of 4 from January 1990 to December 1991, the value of 3
from January 1992 to December 1994, the value of 5 from January 1995 to December 1998,
and the value of 4 from January 1999 to July 1999. In a multi-country investigation of the link
between political weakness and inflation, Edwards and Tabellini (1991) use the same index as
one of the proxies to political weakness.15
Table 1. Brazil’s Vulnerability to Currency Crisis
(units in %GDP, except 
*
t r )
Year t D t R t C
*




t  t 
1996 23.20 7.52 -2.99 5.02 1.33 2.59 3.15 4.55
1/
1997 25.00 6.34 -3.80 5.07 1.45 2.69 3.89 2.96
2/
1998 31.15 5.49 -4.36 4.82 1.74 2.91 4.58 1.36
3/
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (2000) and International Financial Statistics database.
1/ Inside no-crisis region
2/ Inside multiple equilibrium region
3/ Inside crisis region
Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Logit Regression
(I) (II)
Coefficient t-statistics Probability Coefficient t-statistics Probability
Constant -1.627 -2.381 0.0190 -29.573 -2.661 0.0090
NE 9.310 0.354 0.7242 0.003 1.834 0.0695
IR 1.084 3.262 0.0015 2.735 2.830 0.0056
RER -0.056 -2.950 0.0039 -0.204 -2.525 0.0131
NX -0.001 -3.010 0.0032 -0.003 -2.653 0.0092
DUMELC 7.832 3.209 0.0018
NPP 6.806 2.428 0.0168
Pseudo R
2 0.36 0.39
# of Obs. 113 113
# of Obs.
with 1
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